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THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE MILITARY USE
OF THE OCEANS IN 2010
Scott C. Truver, Ph.D.*
This analysis focuses on the likely reliance on military power, specifically naval power, to support national policy in an ambiguous future
international legal regime for the oceans. The uses of sea power in 2010,
as evidenced by the history of peacetime and combat operations conducted over the last 350 years, are not likely to be much different from
the military uses of the oceans in the mid-1980s. Barring an Armageddon
of global nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union,
navies will continue to be relied upon in peace and limited war as the
cutting edge in the employment of military force as a "handmaiden of
diplomacy." Sea power will be a fundamental tool of coercive and
supportive diplomacy employed by coastal and maritime states alike to
safeguard all their interests in the oceans, particularly in light of the
potential for international tension and crisis to arise over ocean rights
and obligations.
In April 1982, after eight years of complex, sometimes byzantine
negotiations, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) adopted the comprehensive Convention on the Law
of the Sea,' but without the United States' acquiescence. Three other
states (Israel, Turkey and Venezuela) joined the United States in voting
against the treaty, while seventeen states, including several NATO allies,
the Soviet Union and most Warsaw Pact countries, abstained; 130 states
voted to accept the convention. The heart of the U.S. rejection, in
addition to other grievances, lay in the perception that the treaty would
not adequately protect U.S. firms which had already made considerable
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investments in deep seabed mining technologies. The President's advisors
also agreed that the operations of the International Seabed Authority
and the Enterprise established by the convention would potentially damage important U.S. policy interests. Nevertheless, other convention provisions, particularly those relating to maritime navigation and naval
operations, were acceptable to Washington.
On 9 July 1982, President Reagan announced his decision not to
sign the treaty when opened for signature later in the year, on 10
December. According to some observers, the United States thereby risked
complete isolation from the new global system of international marine
law. For one, Leigh Ratiner, Deputy Chairman of the U.S. delegation
at the spring 1982 session of UNCLOS III, argued that the United
States "will suffer a significant, long-term foreign policy setback with
grave implications for U.S. influence in world affairs." 2 Two years
earlier, another prominent actor in U.S. law of the sea politics had
voiced his concerns if a comprehensive law of the sea treaty failed 'to
garner U.S. and global acceptance. Aware of the potential for seabed
issues to torpedo U.S. participation in any treaty, Elliot Richardson
warned:
We would thus be forced to sacrifice not only the guarantees
of freedom of navigation and overflight... but other gains as
well, including effective protection of the marine environment,
a stable regime for marine scientific research, and a workable
definition of the outer limits of coastal-state jurisdiction over
oil and gas resources of the continental margin.'
This "all or nothing" philosophy was rejected by John Lehman,
U.S. Secretary of the Navy, who asserted in late July 1982 that "wellestablished" international law and "'amicable relations" with coastal
states, including those holding different interpretations of the law, would
be sufficient to safeguard vital U.S. interests. These "vital interests,"
in Secretary Lehman's view, include maritime and naval transit through
territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, archipelagic waters, and international straits. Other Reagan Administration officials argued that
much of the treaty merely codified existing customary law. For example,
Ambassador James L. Malone, noting that state practice since the United
States refused to sign the treaty had confirmed the existence of law
independent of the treaty, argued:
Particularly with respect to navigation rights, the history of the
law of the sea has been predominantly a history Of customary
laws evolving through 'state practice. The convention does not

2. Ratiner, The Laiw of the Sea: Crossroads for U.S. Policy, 60 Foreign Affairs
1006, 1007 (1982).
3. Richardson, Power, Mobility And the Law of the Sea, 58 Foreign Affairs 902,
917 (1980).
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so much create positive law in the nonseabed area as simply
incorporate existing law that will continue to be applicable to
all states, not because of the treaty, but because of the customary
4
law underlying the treaty.
During this same period, awakened by crises in Iran and Afghanistan,
Lebanon and the Red Sea, and Nicaragua and El Salvador to imperatives
and responsibilities in the Third World, the United States has been
engaged in a debate both at home and abroad over the directions and
form American and Western policies should take concerning the protection of interests both within and outside of NATO. In the Middle
East, the United States for thirty years has viewed the requirements of
maintaining regional stability and an assured flow of oil as necessitating
some form of military-primarily naval-presence in the area. This
presence was intended to underscore the importance of U.S. interests
there and, at the same time, to counter nascent Soviet influence. However, other Third World areas, most notably the Caribbean and Latin
America, Southeast Asia, and Africa, in addition to the "Arc of Crisis"
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, increasingly have captured
the attention of Washington's foreign and defense policy planners.
Since the low point in the post-Vietnam War reluctance to employ
U.S. military force as an instrument of national policy-during Angola's
1975 civil war in which massive Soviet and Cuban aid was offered to
the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola without
a tangible American response-Americans have gradually embraced the
military dimension as an attractive policy alternative to be employed in
situations short of actual conflict. Indeed, as Edward Heath remarked
in the 1980 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, there is a growing
tendency in many governments toward a "more assertive use of military
force as the only way of regaining dignity and authority in a hostile
and confusing world." 5 An important component of this trend, naval
forces are'again being viewed as effective tools of coercive and supportive
diplomacy in these regions of instability and change. The recent U.S.
URGENT FURY operations in Granada and the use of battleship gunfire
support and tactical sea-based air power in Lebanon bear out Heath's
assertion. (Questions remain, however, concerning their effectiveness in
these instances.)
Coupled with the Reagan Administration's commitment to rebuilding
U.S. naval power and maintaining "maritime superiority" over'the Soviet
Union and all other potential adversaries, this perception, if widely held
throughout the Reagan Administration and in other world capitals, may
presage a future of international instability and tension and a greater

4.
5.
1980).

Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty, 54 Foreign Policy (1984).
Heath, The 1980 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, 22 Survival 198 (Sept.-Oct.
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proclivity to employ armed naval force to achieve diplomatic and policy
objectives. Indeed, the conflict between Argentina and Great Britain
over the Falkland Islands, a controversy colored, albeit slightly, by law
of the sea issues, may provide a model for future exercises of armed
suasion by the navies of the superpowers, other traditionally powerful
states, and even developing countries of the Third World.
One important source of possible conflict is over the use of ocean
space as a medium for the movement of naval forces to safeguard
national interests in peacetime and crisis short of declared war. However,
navies also use the seas to carry out exercises, test weapons, conduct
scientific research, and station reconnaissance and surveillance sensors,
activities which, when carried out beyond a nation's territorial jurisdiction, rely on the freedom of the seas and good relationships with allies
and friends. Other areas in which states' oceans interests may collide
are dealt with in other articles in this symposium. Although but a single
aspect of the international law of the sea, the continued ability of navies
to move freely about the world's seas may directly affect, both positively
and negatively, the continued enjoyment of other lawful uses of the
seas by all states.
What is not attempted in this discussion is a projection of naval
forces, capabilities, and military technologies. In essence, this is because
of the inherent "conservatism" of navies. By and large, the specific
naval forces (type, if not the actual units) in existence in 1985 will be
present in the year 2010. For example, large-deck aircraft carriers, the
backbone of the U.S. Navy's general-purpose forces and expected to be
so for the Soviet Navy after 2000, in peacetime have incredibly long
service lives. The U.S. Navy's Midway (CV-41) and Coral Sea (CV-43)
carriers were commissioned in 1945 and 1947, respectively, at a time
when a 25-year lifetime was the norm. Coral Sea completed a $190
million overhaul in early 1985 to keep her active until the early 1990s,
when she will relieve the Lexington (AVT-16, commissioned in 1943) as
the Navy's training carrier-a "first-line" service life of over 45 years.
The Midway is also expected to remain active until the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, the U.S. Navy currently has under construction or on
order three nuclear-propelled carriers of the Nimitz class. Expected to
be commissioned between 1986 and 1991, the 45-year service lives of
these CVNs and their three active (in 1985) sisters will ensure a vital
core of sea power well into the second decade of the next century. The
Soviet navy also has under way an ambitious nuclear carrier building
program, with at least four CVNs being projected for the years after
1990, while France is planning to construct two CVNs which will be
active in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Another example of the "conservatism" of navies is afforded by
the U.S. Navy's on-going battleship reactivation program. The four ships
of the Iowa (BB-61) class were all laid down and commissioned between
June 1940 and April 1944. All four saw action in World War II and
the Korean War, while the New Jersey (BB-62) received an austere
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reactivation as a gun fire support ship in mid-1967 and saw combat off
Vietnam during 1968 and 1969. The current reactivation and modernization program has its genesis in the late 1970s, especially the reaction
in the United States to the 1978-1979 Iranian revolution and ensuing
hostage crisis and the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Many observers believed the United States lacked sufficient military and
naval power to protect U.S. interests, allies, and friends throughout the
world. One aspect of this reaction was a recognition of the need to
enhance the U.S. Navy's major surface vessel combat strength, which
led, eventually, to the program to upgrade and modernize the four Iowa
BBs. The point of this peroration is that warships designed in 1938
have received new weapons and electronic systems that will ensure their
future usefulness and extend their service lives by twenty years. All of
these "old" ships will likely be active in the first decade of the next
century. Moreover, the U.S. Navy is now beginning studies to define
the "next-generation" large surface combatants as follow-ons to current
cruiser and battleship programs, indicating that function if not form of
future ships will be similar to that of the existing fleet.
Certainly there will be advances and technological leaps over the
next twenty-five years, but they will not radically alter the "look" or
uses of sea power. By the year 2010, for example, supersonic short
takeoff and verticlelanding (STOVL) aircraft may be entering widespread
application in modern navies, and may permit the expansion of seabased tactical air power throughout the fleet. The word "may" was
chosen deliberately, as preliminary conceptual design and engineering
studies are only now being pursued seriously. Because it takes an average
of ten to fifteen years for a major new weapon system to reach fruition,
a supersonic STOVL aircraft "may" be operational at the turn of the
century. It will take several more years for viable force structures comprised of these aircraft to be filled out.
Nevertheless, technological developments in lasers, communications,
quieting and "stealth" techniques, computers, radar, offensive and defensive weapons, directed-energy and space-based systems, propulsion
systems, hull forms (SWATH, SES), and the like will obviously have
a dramatic effect on the capabilities of naval forces-submarines, surface
ships, and aircraft-to carry out their present roles and missions, and
perhaps to take on new roles only dimly perceived in 1985. That has
been the promise of technology in naval affairs since sails were first
fitted to canoes. Most fundamentally, these dynamics will ensure the
continued usefulness of navies to support their governments' policies in
peace and war. At the margin, however, the impact of these developments
on the law is likely to be much less pervasive than some would think.
The law in 2010 will remain as relevant to the employment policies and
practices of sea power as it is in the mid-1980s.
These issues are of vital concern to the future peaceful relations
among states, at both regional and global levels of analysis. In the
absence of general agreement on ocean law, the potential for instability
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and crisis will increase dramatically, while the use of naval force in
2010 to support principles and to protect national interests may ultimately
impede international cooperation. The Gulf of Sidra incident of August
1981, involving elements of the U.S. Navy and the Libyan air force, is
an example of what the future may hold as disputes -over ocean zones
and uses multiply.
Sea Power and the Diplomacy of Violence
The ambiguity of the present international legal milieu for the oceans
and the expectation that this situation is likely to continue well into the
twenty-first century compels an analysis of sea power as both a means
to protect national interests endangered by controversy and a source of
controversy itself. Sea power has remained an important element in the
maintenance of international stability and peace in the post-World War
II era, even during a period when nuclear weapons and "massive response" employment policies were thought to have made navies obsolete.
A traditional view of sea power is concerned with the application
of military power at sea, whether it be airborne, surface, or submarine.
That is, sea power traditionally has been measured by the numbers,
types, and gross tonnages of ships and submarines, and by the numbers
and types of guns, aircraft, and weapons carried on board these platforms. In a somewhat simplistic calculus, the aggregate inventories of
naval power could be added and compared, thus arriving at a measure,
however crude, of a country's sea power. But this method ignored more
important variables such as the operational characteristics of the weapons
carried, reload rates and number of reloads carried, speed, endurance,
the skill and professionalism of crews, the basing facilities and support
required and available, the missions of the individual ships or groups
of ships, and how these naval assets fit into a country's overall strategic
doctrine.
Increasingly, moreover, it has been argued that sea power embraces
much more than just naval force, that it encompasses all of a nation's
resources which can be devoted to naval/maritime activities. Indeed,
since 1956 this perception has been strongly advocated by Admiral of
the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov, who has argued that
a country's sea power is determined by its merchant marine; its fishing
and oceanographic fleets; its maritime outlook, tradition, and history;
6
as well as its weapons and armed forces.
As important as the civil maritime assets are, however, this discussion
is concerned solely with the present and future uses of naval power,
especially in the legal-politico-military context of the future law of the
sea. That is, why do states want navies and what purpose does sea

6. MccGwire, Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy, in NOPS, Soviet Oceans
Development 135-41 (Washington, DC: Gov't Printing Office 1976).
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power serve in a "peacetime" environment? Second, what are the special
attributes of sea power which permit states to pursue their politicomilitary objectives by relying upon naval force? And finally, what are
the roles of naval power as an instrument of foreign policy in situations
short of war?
The U.S. Navy publication, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy,
NWP-1 , provides a clear statement of the importance of sea power to
the United States. America's geographical position, the location of major
allies, America's great dependence on international seaborne trade, and
the increasing importance of the oceans as sources of food, energy and
minerals offer compelling rationales for the missions, structure, and size
of the U.S. Navy. The central importance of the seas to continued
American prosperity and national security is evident in this excerpt from
NWP-I:
The United States is a maritime nation with only two international frontiers and thousands of miles of coastline bordering
on two of the world's largest oceans ....
Unlike its potential
adversaries, the United States is heavily involved in the interdependent world economy. Should the sea lines of communication be interdicted for any length of time, the welfare of U.S.
citizens would be radically impaired. The majority of U.S. allies
are overseas and even more dependent of free use on the seas
than we are. The critical support required by them in time of
war is that which can be projected across the seas. All U.S.
international relations, be they economic, political, or military,
are influenced by this heavy dependence on free and unimpeded
passage on the oceans of the world. The dependence on the
seas impacts directly on any consideration of national strategy.7
The doctrinal foundation for this statement was expressed at the
end of the nineteenth century in the writings of Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan, whose conception of the close relationships among national
power, foreign policy, and sea power provided a cardinal thesis for the
use of sea power to further national objectives.8 Mahan perceived the
sea as "a great highway" or "a wide common" providing countries
having access to it with an easier and cheaper means of transportation
than across land. Using Great Britain as an example and citing the
effective use of the sea for both commercial and military transport which
brought Great Britain tremendous wealth and international prestige,
Mahan argued that no nation that aspired to great power status could
ignore the importance of sea power. Navies, the tools with which to
forge great power, had two purposes in Mahan's scheme. The first was

7. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, NWP-I (Washington, DC: Department
of the Navy, January 1977), p. 2-1.
8. A. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660-1783, ch. 1 (1965).
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to protect commerce, so that no country could interfere with the free
use of the oceans as an avenue for international trade. The second
purpose was to carry out "aggression" or combat.
These two rationales are implicit in the strategic concepts which will
provide doctrinal guidance for the U.S. Navy for the remainder of this
century and into the next. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger,
in his February 1985 Annual Report to Congress, discussed the maritime
mission of the U.S. Navy:
The United States has traditionally maintained a strong Navy
to preserve the freedom of the seas and to support the global
commitments associated with its forward defense strategy. In
peacetime, naval forces are routinely deployed overseas as a
means of reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries.
In times of crisis, their inherent mobility permits them to be
redeployed to world trouble spots rapidly without relying heavily
on foreign bases or special transit rights. Deployed to areas of
vital interest to the United States and its overseas allies, naval
forces can remain on station for extended periods, ready to
project power ashore should deterrence fail and the circumstances
warrant American military action. If need be, they can apply
power rapidly and flexibly in support of such key objectives as
protecting friendly shipping from air or sea attacks, depriving
enemy forces of access to strategic ocean areas, and protecting
power against enemy targets ashore.
Taken together, these capabilities make our naval forces a powerful instrument for peace and stability in an often troubled world.
Their importance to Western security and world peace requires that
we take steps to maintain their strength in future years. 9
Special attributes and broad options inherent in the use of naval
forces have made them particularly well suited for the purposes of the defense of sea lines of communication (SLOC) and the projection of power
into regions of importance to the state. Naval units have the capability to
respond quickly to crisis situations and contingencies world-wide with the
precise type and magnitude of force necessary to achieve the stated objective. The naval forces of the major maritime powers have the capability to
apply military power deftly across the entire spectrum of armed force: from
the maintenance of unobtrusive presence, to the deliberate show of force for
political purpose, to limited war, to general conventional war, to a launch
of a strategic nuclear attack. Naval force, then, is flexible and possesses wide
geographical reach. As Hedley Bull has described these special qualities:

9. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on
the FY 86 Budget, FY 1987 Authorization Request and FY 1986-90 Defense Programs
153 (Washington, DC: Gov't Printing Office 1985).
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As an instrument of diplomacy, sea power has long been thought
to possess certain classical advantages vis-a-vis land power and,
more recently, air power. The first of these advantages is its flexibility: a naval force can be sent and withdrawn, and its size and
activities varied, with a higher expectation that it will remain subject to control than is possible when ground forces are committed.
The second is its visibility: by being seen on the high seas or in
foreign ports a navy can convey threats, provide reassurance, or
earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft in their home bases
cannot do. The third is universality or pervasiveness: the fact that
the seas, by contrast with the land and the air, are an international
medium allows naval vessels to reach distant countries independently of nearby bases and makes a state possessed of sea power
the neighbor of every other country that is accessible by sea.10
Inherent in the peacetime use of navies, however, is the ability to travel
freely upon the oceans of the world. Without the free use of international
ocean space, these special attributes of naval force for the exercise of sea
power in peacetime can provide little benefit to the nation with great power
ambitions.
The presence of naval forces in a region or off a nation's coast can
serve as a highly visible reminder of an ally's interest or commitment. Both
the U.S. and, increasingly since the mid-1960s, the Soviet navies have been
used numerous times world-wide in this manner, while other states' navies
have similarly been relied upon in more circumscribed regions. In a crisis
where military force may be required to protect national security interests,
to evacuate nationals, or to support a friendly government, but where the
visible presence of military forces could further inflame the situation, naval
forces can remain out of sight over the horizon, ready to respond quickly
if necessary. And, just as the visibility of naval force can be regulated to
suit national needs, the military capabilities of naval forces can be controlled; naval presence can be large or small, provocative or unobtrusive,
depending on the situation and the interplay of interests.
For centuries navies have thus been the "handmaidens of diplomacy,"
and, as Barry Blechman instructed in 1975:
A nation's navy not only defends its coastal waters and protects
national interest aboard; it also signals overall military potential
and political intent to influence world affairs. Changes in relative
naval strength among the leading powers have always been watched
closely in other nations on the assumption that the size of a country's conventional naval forces reflects its willingness-and abilityto affect political events. This assumption prevails even today when
more potent weapons are available.

10. Bull, Sea Power and Political Influence, Power at Sea I: The New Environment
6 (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 122, Spring 1976).

1230

0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Navies support diplomacy in more direct ways as well. Armed
confrontation between opposing fleets has often marked the opening of hostilities between great powers; perhaps just as often it has
led to a settlement of their dispute. And great powers frequently
have relied upon warships to impose their will upon lesser states.
There is even a term for this: gunboat diplomacy. 1
In his study of The Political Uses of Sea Power, Edward N. Luttwak
provided an analytical overview of the uses of navies in peacetime situations short of war.' 2 He described the presence mission in terms of "suasion" because of the importance of the symbolic uses of sea power and
the central place of the psychological perceptions and reactions of the parties against whom a naval threat-however ambiguously or precisely defined-is projected. Luttwak argued that there is a dynamic linkage between
any deployment of naval force and a country's political interest in the area
to which the force is deployed. He invited his readers to distinguish discrete
actions within a continuum of naval suasion by which this linkage is exploited: between those actions which are latent or routine and those active
deployments that involve a deliberate attempt to invoke a desired reaction;
between actions which are designed to coerce adversaries and those which
are supportive of allies; between acts which deter specific reactions and
suasion that is compellent in nature; and between armed suasion symbolizing naval force deployed for specific situations and naval deployments
that symbolize general national commitment and resolve.
However, naval symbolism and war-fighting capabilities must be considered together, especially in an evaluation of the efficacy of armed naval
force to support national objectives in a peacetime international environment in which highly sophisticated and lethal weapons are widely held and
the relevant international law may be controversial. In order to encourage
allies, to deter potential adversaries, or to influence non-aligned states,
naval forces deployed to a region on a routine basis or to a crisis area in
an emergency must possess clearly yisible war-fighting capabilities. That
is, whenever naval forces are committed to supportive or coercive diplomatic roles, especially when weapons might be involved, and particularly
for the purpose of asserting rights in legal or political disputes, the "primary axiom" is that the forces used must be superior, or at least capable
of the requisite degree of self-defense in the event of challenge. Particularly
in situations "where the law can be used as a political excuse to achieve a
fait accompli it is fatal to undertake the risk of demonstrating in favor of
a particular view of the law if superior force is not available to sustain the
option."P3 This was the case in the qulf of Sidra incident concerning Libyan

11.
ington,
12.
13.

Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities I (WashD.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).
E. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (1974).
D. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power 8 (1975).
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claims that the Gulf was "internal water," and in the United Kingdom's
response to Argentine aggression in the Falklands. (Lebanese Shiite terrorism in June 1985 perhaps showed the limits of naval power to support state
policies and interests.)
On 19 August 1981, elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet were conducting
exercises in the southcentral Mediterranean Sea and the northwestern Gulf
of Sidra, off the Libyan coast, a region in which the United States had
previously conducted naval exercises. The exercises were begun only after
routine notification had been given to aircraft and ships operating in the
area; the U.S. Navy's clear range procedures had been followed explicitly.
However, after numerous interceptions of Libyan fighter aircraft had been
carried out by the combat air patrol aircraft based on the USS Nimitz
(CVN-68), in the early morning of 19 August, two Libyan SU-22 fighters
failed to turn away from the exercise area. Instead, one of them fired two
air-to-air missiles at two U.S. F-14 Tomcat fighters. The Tomcats took
evasive action and, as the rules of engagement under which they were operating at the time specified defensive fire was permitted only if they were
attacked first, quickly shot down both Libyan aircraft.
The incident occurred over Libya's disputed claim to sovereignty in
the Gulf of Sidra, a claim dating to October 1973 when Libya gave notice
that a 275 nautical mile long closing line connecting Misurata and Benghazi
delimited Libyan internal waters; furthermore, a twelve nautical mile territorial sea was claimed, drawn from the same closing line. The United
States and other states, including Great Britain and France, had continuously rejected Libya's claim as without any foundation in international
law. Since 1973, moreover, the United States had repeatedly challenged the
Libyan claim by purposefully sending ships and aircraft into the disputed
area. Only on one occasion, so far, has the U.S. challenge been met by
armed counter-challenge and, then, superior force was available to reinforce the U.S. view of the law.
In Falklands crisis, because diplomatic negotiations continued while
the British fleet was assembled and sailed to the South Atlantic in the
spring of 1982, after Argentine forces had landed on the Falklands and
South Georgia, the ships at the very least had to look capable of retaking
the islands. However, the ships were principally configured to fight in North
Atlantic battles in defense of NATO, largely an antisubmarine warfare
mission, not to carry out an extended, force-projection operation some
8,000 miles from home. This factor contributed to Argentine intransigence.
After all, fighting in their "backyard," only 400 miles from the mainland,
Argentina's military command could not conceive of defeat.
At the outset of the Falklands crisis, then, because the eventual outcome could not be predicted from a simple analysis of the balance of forces
available to each side, a diplomatic settlement acceptable to the United
Kingdom was impossible prior to bloodshed. Although the Argentine air
force inflicted terrible losses on the British task force, the availability of
superior force-superior in terms not only of equipment and weapons, but
of the professionalism and tactical skill of its forces, and political conditions
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at home and abroad-enabled the British to carry the day. As Laurence
Martin has remarked on the use of force in similar situations:
In all limited operations, prudence requires anticipating what the
outcome would be if the incident escalated to higher levels. Thus,
ideally, one should enter a nonbelligerent demonstration with the
ability to prevail if it evolves into limited war and limited war with
the confidence of winning any larger conflict that might result...
"gunboat diplomacy" had its full efficacy when behind the gunboat was known to lurk a cruiser, and behind the cruiser a battle

fleet. 14
Naval forces deployed abroad in diplomatic roles, whether in 1985 or
2010, must therefore be perceived by the target country's leaders as possessing that capability, and the national command authorities must be perceived as willing to use the available capabilities, so that potential counterthreats will not materialize in the first place. And if they do, naval forces
must be so configured and manned to be successful in their tasks. The
linkage between national interests and naval capabilities cannot be ambiguous in the use of naval force as an instrument of foreign policy in situations short of war. The opportunities for misperception and miscalculation
are high, creating additional dangers in an already risky environment.
Throughout the post-war period, the United States has turned most
often to its Navy when it desired to employ components of the armed
forces to support policy objectives.' 5 Of the 215 incidents reported between
1946 and 1975, naval units alone or in conjunction with other elements of
U.S. armed forces, participated in 177 incidents (over 82%). Since 1955
the U.S. Navy was involved in over 99% of all occasions: aircraft carriers
participated in 106 incidents, amphibious forces in 71, and the U.S. Marine
Corps was committed twice as often as was the U.S. Army.
Since 1975, U.S. naval forces have been actively deployed in support
of policy in the Middle East, Central America, Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia, in addition to routine operations in forward areas. Not all incidents were in the same coercive-compellent mode as the 1983-1984 naval
operations involving the U.S. aircraft Independence (CV-64), the battleship
New Jersey (BB-62), and the cruiser Ticonderoga(CG-47) off Beirut, when
air strikes and naval gunfire were used against Syrian and Lebanese
insurgents threatening Amin Gemayel's government.
For example, in the late summer of 1984, the United States sent three
ships, eight mine countermeasures helicopters, and over 1,500 personnel in
"Operation INTENSE LOOK," in support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Mine countermeasures assets from Great Britain, France, Italy, and the

14.
(1985).
15.
(1976).

Martin, The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime, 38 Naval War College Rev., 10
B. Blechman & S. Kaplan, The Use of Armed Forces as a Political Instrument
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Netherlands were also deployed to assist in mine hunting. Between early
July and the end of September, nineteen ships were identified as possibly
"striking" mines in the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, and the Bab el Mandeb. 16 Although the terrorist group Islamic Jihad (Holy War) claimed responsibility, initial suspicion centered on Iran and Libya. Subsequent
intelligence analysis, circumstantial evidence relating to a Libyan flag ferryboat that had made a circuitous voyage through the region immediately
prior to the explosions, and analysis by the Royal Navy of a Soviet-made
mine it recovered in the Gulf Suez point to Libyan culpability. The navies
of the five Western states provided assistance to the coastal states in keeping the vital international waterway open for navigation that had been
threatened by this new form of state-supported maritime terrorism. It is
this type of positive support which sea power makes possible.
The Soviet navy has also recognized the possibilities of the use of sea
power to influence foreign leaders and support Moscow's foreign policies.
Indeed, Soviet doctrine has accepted the classical concept of seapower, as
is evident in the writings of Admiral Gorshkov:
Owing to the high mobility and endurance of its combatants, the
navy possesses the capability to vividly demonstrate the economic
and military might of a country beyond its borders during peacetime. This quality is normally used by the political leadership of
the imperialist states to show their readiness for decisive actions,
to deter or suppress the intentions of potential enemies, as well as
to support "friendly states." . . . Consequently, the role of a navy
is not limited to the execution of important missions in armed
combat. While representing a formidable force in war, it has always been an instrument of policy of the imperialist states and an
important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater degree than other branches
of the armed forces to exert pressure on potential enemies without
the direct employment of weaponry. 17
The Soviet navy is configured, first and foremost, to carry out its
combat missions in any future world conflict. Strategic nuclear strikes,
protection of Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and fleet
operations against enemy SSBNs, carrier battle groups, and surface fleets
are the principal wartime missions of the Soviet navy. In addition to these
war-fighting roles, the new classes (since 1975) of Soviet submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft carriers have increasingly been relied upon
to support a peacetime "internationalist mission," which includes such
activities as friendly port visits at one extreme, or, at the other, the actual

16. See Truver,
Naval Review (May
17. Translation
1972), published in

The Mines of August: An International Whodunit, U.S. Naval Institute
1985).
of an article by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov (Morskoi Sbornik 2 Nov.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1974), p. 59.
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use of armed force in crises or limited wars where Soviet state interests are
engaged. Indeed, it could be argued that current and projected future Soviet naval shipbuilding programs, 'especially the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and multi-mission surface combatants, like Kirov and Slava,
are intended to be used to influence international events during peace and
crisis short of war, during which actual combat with Western navies is to
be avoided.
Nevertheless, extensive war-fighting and power-projection capabilities
are fundamental to a Soviet policy of coercive naval diplomacy. These
capabilities, moreover, will be necessary in any conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Yet, because of the particular ideological
basis of Soviet concepts of war and national strategy, the prevention of
total world war is a prime objective of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless,
conflict with the "decadent, bourgeoise, capitalist West" can, as a matter
of policy, occur at lower levels of international violence. It is at these levels
of "limited wars" of national liberation and "gunboat diplomacy" that
the new Soviet navy will play its most likely roles, particularly after the
year 2000.
Admiral Gorshkov argued in 1973 that the future development of the
Soviet navy will be characterized by an intensification of its "internationalist mission," that the Soviet navy will be relied upon as a "consolidator of
international relations."' 8 Later, in his book Sea Power of the State,
Gorshkov announced that the naval forces being produced in the mid-1970s
and the next decades will permit "projection of power" operations in the
Third World, "to promote the strengthening of peace and friendship between the peoples and restraining the aggressive strivings of the imperialist
states."' 9 From the perspective of Western concepts of "gunboat diplomacy," Gorshkov's statements imply strongly that the peacetime roles of the
Soviet navy will be managed according to the specific requirements of individual situations, from friendly and supportive operations to fleet deployments intended to coerce, deter, and compel responses in support of Soviet
foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the peacetime operations of the Soviet
navy since the mid-1950s underscore a strong, and continually growing, reliance on naval forces to achieve specific policy goals, each but a single element in the overall strategy leading to the eventual defeat of the West,
without necessarily predestining general war between the Capitalist and Socialist blocs. As one analyst has concluded:
...the improved Soviet Navy and its potential for the geopolitical
role has not gone unnoticed by Soviet leaders. Even if some of
Admiral Gorshkov's boasts about the global advancement of Soviet state interests can be discounted as service special pleading,
the pledges of Marshal Grechko that Soviet military power ensures

18.
19.

Quoted in N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy 39 (1983).
S. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State 277 (1979).
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the irreversibility of socialist gains around the world clearly endorse an "imperial" role for the Soviet Navy which recent history
well illustrates.... [T]he mere presence of the Soviet Navy on all
the high seas has radically altered the context within which the
United States must consider both the war and peacetime exercise
of its own sea power.2 0
The New InternationalMilitary Environment
It is evident in 1985, however, that the largely permissive-or at worst
benign-international environment that since 1945 allowed the wide-ranging application of military force at sea may be changing to a future environment in which the opportunities for coercive diplomatic uses of naval
forces by the great powers could become severely circumscribed. Two trends
reinforce this perception: (1) the widespread availability of sophisticated
weapons among coastal states, and (2) an evolving politico-legal system in
which the traditional concepts of the freedom of the seas may be subject to
strong opposition, especially given the inconclusive nature of the UNCLOS
III deliberations.
The naval and maritime states in 2010 could be inhibited in certain regions of the world by comparatively weaker coastal powers because the
widespread sale of modern weapons among them has heightened the risks
of armed intervention and has raised doubts about the efficacy of symbolic
shows of force offshore. There are two facets to the development, one psychological and the other military, although both are closely related. As
Hedley Bull has warned:
These states have so altered the international legal rules relating to
the use of force and magnified the costs of breaking them as to have
precluded the older kind of "gunboat diplomacy," which assumed
a set of rules weighted in favor of the strong European powers and
a division of the world into fully and partially sovereign states. They
will be able to appeal to the prevailing Third World animus against
interference by the rich industrial states of East and West, a spirit
reflected in General Assembly majorities . . . and solemnized in
zones of peace, such as that proclaimed since 1972 in relation to
2
the Indian Ocean. 1
It is the military dimension of these changing circumstances that will
provide the capabilities to fulfill Third World ambitions. The sinking of the
Israeli destroyer Eilath in 1967 by Russian-built and -provided cruise missiles
launched from small, fast patrol boats of the Egyptian navy and the destruction of the Pakistani destroyer Khaibarby Styx cruise missiles launched

20. Martin, supra note 14, at 7-8.
21. Bull, supra note 10, at 7; also, Truver, New International Constraints on Military
Power: Navies in the Political Role, Naval War College Review (July-August 1981).
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from Indian missile boats in December 1971 graphically illustrated the lethality of the readily-available modern weapons.
The Falklands battles in 1982 were seen by some analysts as irrefutable
evidence that even modern and highly capable surface combatants are vulnerable to small, relatively cheap, precision-guided munitions, or even
"dumb" weapons, and that large warships would be doomed if caught in
any conflict involving the use of widely available, sophisticated weapons like
Exocet antiship missiles. The sinking of the aged Argentine cruiser General
Belgrano, hit by two World War Il-vintage MK 8 torpedoes fired from the
British nuclear attack submarine (SSN) Conqueror, and the extensive damage inflicted on the British fleet by Argentine aircraft employing pre-Vietnam War-era technologies, weapons, and tactics likewise underscored the
deadliness of even obsolescent weapon systems. The point is that numerous
coastal states in the mid-1980s possess the military wherewithal to counter
directly the naval threats of the major powers, especially if the threats materialize close off-shore, and, over the next twenty-five years, many more
coastal countries are likely to take advantage of the largess of the superpowers and other major weapons suppliers-the French, British, Brazilians, and Israelis, among others-to develop potent (in a local or regional
context) forces. And, the inhibitions on the use of force against each other's navies apparently felt by the nuclear superpowers may be absent in a
small coastal state's risk calculus. Michael MccGwire has offered a terse
admonition that reads like an epitaph:
Meanwhile, "missiles don't know their mums," and Soviet-supplied weapons can protect against Soviet as well as American intervention. By the same token, the United States may come to regret
22
the lavish distribution of her latest ships and fighters.
The Falklands crisis again provides important lessons for the future. The
French-built Exocet missiles that struck and sank the British destroyer
Sheffield and the RO/RO ship Atlantic Conveyor by some accounts included British components comprising 20% of each missile. The British,
moreover, expected to find themselves up against missiles, ships, helicopters, and radars they had sold to Argentina, in addition to other NATOsupplied weapons. The battles thus gave pause for reflection; the weapons
suppliers should now know that in some future conflict they may face the
weapons they have sold.
These developments portend at best an uncertain future for the continued successful use of naval forces in diplomatic roles, and may push the
"safe" areas for naval demonstrations farther out to sea, beyond the range
of missiles, aircraft, and ships based along the shore. Coupled with Third
World moves for expanded coastal state sovereignty and jurisdiction over
adjacent marine areas, the potential for controversy and conflict to ensue

22. MccGwire, Maritime Strategy and the Super Powers, in Power at Sea II: Super
Powers and Navies 18 (London IISS, Adelphi Paper 123, Spring 1976).
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over different interpretations of the law of the sea is expected to increase
dramatically over the next quarter-century. Because of the new military environment, a premium will be placed on the military capabilities to enforce
the law.
The Law of the Sea in Transition
In his excellent analysis, The Influence of Law on Seapower, D.P.
O'Connell described the nexus between the law and sea power:
It is the law of the sea which dictates the practicalities of this deployment of sea power, related to areas of its exercise and the modes
of its exercise. Changes in the law of the sea in these respects would
alter the factors which give rise to or aggravate political tension ....23
Because the sea is the only area "where armed forces can joust with
more or less seriousness in order to promote political objectives, ' 24 the advantages and disadvantages of rules of international law-rules of the road;
national jurisdiction and sovereignty over sea areas; national rules of engagement; rules about installations, cables, and pipelines; rules about pollution control-are fundamentally important to naval operations. The
"freedom of the seas" is not absolute; it is constrained and qualified in the
mode and place of its exercise.
However, the roles that the law will play in shaping the use of naval
force will be tied to levels of political tension and the specific goals of a state
that resorts to sea power. Perceptions of the importance of law in its relations to political objectives will shape states' responses to "peacetime
crises" or "peacetime limited war." O'Connell recognized the dynamic
properties of law, as evidenced by the history of sea power in the modern
state era, which:
reveals the persistent interaction of law and naval policy, although
the emphasis has at different times variously affected the interests
to be protected, the areas of sea in which naval power has been deployed, and the weapons to be used .... The law has never been
static. Its pliable character has meant that it has been made to serve
the purposes of sea power, and so has become a weapon in the naval armoury. Just how it has played this role has depended on the
issues that occasioned the resort to naval force, but it has always
been prominent in giving form and character to the issues as well
as influencing the conduct of those who have sought their
25
resolution.

23. O'Connell, supra note 13, at 189.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id.at 16.
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Certainly, this should not be interpreted that the rules of law will always be observed, particularly in an imperfect world where some rights
cannot be safeguarded except by the use of force. Furthermore, there will
always be situations where the gains to be achieved will be perceived as
outweighing the cost of rejecting the rules. The point to be considered is,
however,
• .. not whether the law is breached but how it enters into the
decision to breach it, what value it has in the circumstances compared with other values, and what influence it is allowed to have.
It does not cease to be law merely because it is relegated to a low
level of priority, but neither should it be presumed that it will be
26
so relegated.
What is remarkable in peacetime, crisis, and war is that generally the
rules are observed. Indeed, states have used the law to interpose ships,
confine the enemy to his ports, deny him tactical advantage, and deprive
him of access to neutral cargoes, often without shots being fired, and often
without the resort to unlawful countermeasures. If international law was
ignored, this usually occurred as the military and political situations became so desperate that curbs on the conduct of naval operations were of
no value or political importance. This hardly ever occurred, however, at
the outset of crises or even war. In "peacetime" crises and limited wars,
the expectation is that central, strategic values of the state will not usually
be threatened-the rhetoric of the Cuban Missile Crisis shows the exception-and the legal rules will usually be followed. Where laws were disregarded in the use of armed force, it has usually been done with reference
to the concept of self-defense, and even then this rationale has limitations
based on the ideas of the necessity and proportionality of the response to
the threat. In short, O'Connell notes that "the only prediction" possible
is that:
...the lower the level of conflict, the more localized the situation
and the more restricted the objectives, the more predominant will
be the element of law in the governing of naval conduct; and that
the law will assume a diminished role-as it did in the Second
World War-when the conflict becomes global, when an element
of desperation has entered into operational planning ....
[Wihat
is likely is a proliferation of the causes of dispute and of technologically advanced naval methods for dealing with them... [Tihe
uses of sea power at an advanced level are not likely to be confined
to the traditional naval Powers of the northern hemisphere.27
Although trends can be traced at least to the 1930s, the failure of the
second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960 to reach agree-

26. Id.at 52.
27. Id. at 3.
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ment on a specific limit for territorial seas seemed to result in an erosion
of traditional rules and expanding claims of coastal state jurisdiction and
sovereignty. Clearly, interests in mobility and transit rights of navies, critical components in the exercise of sea-based military power, had the potential to be jeopardized by a new consensus on expansive zones of coastal
state control. Arthur H. Dean, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the
1960 Geneva Conference, remarked before the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee:
Our navy would like to see as narrow a territorial sea as possible
in order to preserve the maximum possibility of deployment, transit,
and maneuverability on and over the high seas. . . The primary
danger to the continuance of the ability of our warships and supporting aircraft to move, unhampered, to wherever they may be
needed to support American foreign policy presents itself in the
great international straits of the world-the narrows which lie athwart the sea routes which connect us and our widely scattered
friends and allies and admit us to the strategic materials we do not
ourselves possess.2" This perception largely shaped the initial positions of the United States, Soviet Union, and other naval powers
in the preparatory U.N. Seabed Committee and the early negotiations at UNCLOS III.
Indeed, several years later, after UNCLOS III was convened, Elizabeth
Young warned that a fundamental change had already begun, that the
international legal system was moving incrementally away from the traditional doctrine of mare liberum toward a system of mare clausum. She
argued that despite the efforts of the maritime and naval powers in the
Seabed Committee and at UNCLOS III to preserve as much of the high
seas and traditional freedoms as desirable and possible, this enclosure
movement seemed destined to continue because of the press of technological advances, economic demand for resources, and national jealousies and
rivalries. In the future world she envisioned, the "great navies"
.. . will find their traditional roaming of the open seas, "showing
the flag" in their nation's interest, constrained, psychologically
where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional
boundaries of quite unfamiliar texture, the nature of new kinds of
sovereignty . . . will need establishing not only by theoretical definition, in terms of international convention, but also by subjec29
tion to all the normative pressures of practice and experience.
Certainly, this has not yet happened. And while the next twenty five
years may witness dramatic changes in some aspects of the law of sea, the

28. Quoted in D. Bowett, The Law of the Sea 7 (1967).
29. Young, New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea,
16 Survival 265 (1974).
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maritime and naval states' interests in navigation rights have clearly been
satisfied in the Law of the Sea Convention produced by UNCLOS III.
These powerful states, moreover, will resist any further changes to the rules
that might inhibit the military uses of the oceans. In a sense, the new ocean
regime represents a grand compromise over core values, a compromise in
which the coastal states accepted relatively unconstrained navigation provisions in return for broadened coastal control over resources, research,
and marine pollution. As one analyst has summarized the UNCLOS process and its implications for naval uses of the oceans:
During UNCLOS, a strong contingent of coastal states tried various ways of restricting the activity of foreign warships in their
coastal waters ... part of a general attempt to extend sovereignty
and jurisdiction into the oceans, but in this sector they met extremely determined opposition from the maritime powers. While the
maritime powers were prepared to concede very large areas of control over resources and associated activities, they refused to yield
almost anything on the rights of warships.3"
Under customary international law, the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, navigation in the territorial sea is regulated by the provisions of innocent passage-the one exception to complete coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea. However, previously the rules presented
difficulties stemming from "subjective interpretations:" the activities that
are "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state"
remained ill-defined and contentious. Moreover, some coastal states maintained that foreign warships in general could not pass through territorial
seas unless prior notification were provided. And, while submarines would
have to navigate on the surface in innocent passage, no similar right was
enjoyed by military aircraft.
At UNCLOS III, members of the Group of 77 tried to extend the legal
distinctions between warships and commercial vessels, with the idea that a
broader right of navigation could be preserved for the latter while the
former would have greater restrictions applied. This move was rejected by
the naval powers and no significant distinctions have been added to the
law which would empower coastal states to discriminate against warships
in their territorial seas. In fact, while the 1982 treaty still excluded submerged navigation and overflight from the definition of innocent passage,
it makes no distinction between commercial ships and combatants in the
exercise of the right, and in the second paragraph of Article 19 specifically
enumerates the activities of ships, and not the character of the ships
themselves, which would make a specific transit non-innocent.

30. Buzan, Naval Power, the Law of the Sea, and the Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace, 5 Marine Policy 194 (1981).

1985]

LA W OF THE SEA

1241

In a similar fashion, some coastal states tried to extend their jurisdiction over adjacent waters to apply restrictions to warships arising from the
delimitation of territorial seas in straits and the placement of archipelagic
waters. With regard to straits, the issue was critical for the mobility of
naval forces. Under the existing regime, only a non-suspendable right of
innocent passage would be enjoyed in straits used for international navigation."' The United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and other maritime states considered this regime to be unacceptable. The 1982 treaty
therefore includes provisions for "transit passage" (Part III) and "archipelagic sea lanes passage" (Part IV, Article 53) that represent a clear preservation of military/naval interests in return for the maritime states'
agreement to a 12 nautical mile-wide territorial sea. "All ships and aircraft" enjoy "transit passage" rights in straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone, for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit (Articles 37 and 38). The
"normal mode" of transit is permitted, which includes submerged navigation by submarines. The coastal states are accorded certain limited regulatory powers (Articles 41 and 42), and specific rules are established for
the activities permitted or prohibited to ships and aircraft in the exercise
of transit passage (Articles 39 and 40). These rules are also to apply to
ships and aircraft exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage
(Article 54). The straits and archipelagic waters issues were, in O'Connell's
analysis:
• . . the most vital legal issue of sea power, because it is in confined waters that naval coups can best be effected under the pretext of self-defense, and there that intolerable obstruction can be
32
effectively raised to strategic and tactical deployment.
An interesting question concerning the "normal modes" of transit passage
was highlighted during the 1984 "mines of August" crisis in the Red Sea
and Gulf of Suez. Because of the threat of mines in the Bab el Mandeb,
the U.S. Navy sent mine countermeasures helicopters that had been
operating from the USS La Salle (AGF-3) off Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to
sweep the northern part of the strait immediately prior to the 29 August
transit of the U.S. carrier America (CV-66) and her escorts. Presumably,
the mine-sweeping was conducted in high seas areas of Bab el Mandeb in
this instance, and times did not require coastal state approval. However,
if in the future radical states or terrorists rely on mine warfare to frustrate
the movements of navies through international straits, certainly a self-defense rationale for minesweeping of suspected waters could be advanced.

31. See Truver, The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, in 4 International
Straits of The World (1980); and Moore, The Regime of Straits and The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 77 (1980).
32. O'Connell, supra note 13 at 103.
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Such a practice could conceivably be justified as falling within (an expansive interpretation of) the 1982 Convention's provisions that ships and aircraft can engage in activities not related to "those incident to their normal
modes" of transit if the otherwise prohibited activities are made necessary
by force majeure or distress. It is likely to be controversial, in any event,
and a common practice of sweeping strategic sea areas like straits could
become a source of significant international discord.
The concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) also provided the
opportunity during UNCLOS III for several radical coastal states to seek
greater restrictions on the mobility of warships. Some states called for
"security zones," while others argued that the waters of the EEZ were not
high seas as the EEZ was a zone sui generis. The discussions eventually
narrowed to arguments over residual rights, whether rights not specified
in the convention fell to the coastal state or to the international community, or whether the EEZ was high seas except for gpecific "sovereign
rights" of the coastal state over resources and other specified jurisdictions.
The maritime and naval states remained steadfast in opposition to coastal
state "creeping jurisdiction" over their security interests.
The 1982 convention provides sweeping high seas rights to be enjoyed
by all states in the EEZ, while giving the coastal state "sovereign rights"
for "exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing" natural resources, and "jurisdiction" over artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of
the marine environment in the zone (Article 56). Article 58 cross-references
Article 89 to the effect that no state can subject any part of the EEZ to its
total sovereignty, and identifies the safeguarded high seas freedoms of Article 87 to be enjoyed by all states in EEZs. This provision, however, is
restricted by the undefined caveat in Article 88 that the high seas are reserved for "peaceful purposes," although the restriction seems to have
very little substance, as Elliot Richardson has noted:
• .. military maneuvers and activities that do not violate the [U.N.]
Charter are permitted; and the fact that a particular coastal state
may have a low threshold of anxiety regarding ships and aircraft
off its coast cannot diminish the rights of the flag state, although
the latter must pay due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal
state."
Only in the area of marine scientific research did the coastal states
manage, obliquely, to circumscribe naval activities. However, this is a broad
issue that involves more than just national security and naval interests. The
convention contains a fairly restrictive "consent regime" with the familiar
caveat that marine scientific research is to be conducted exclusively for
"peaceful purposes." This restriction is of some concern to global naval

33. Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional National Security
Considerations, 119 San Diego L. Rev. 574 (1982).
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powers like the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United States which
conduct extensive "in-house" naval oceanographic research to support the
combat operations of their fleets. In an attempt to circumvent the "naval"
label that could be used to deny consent, the military, especially in the
West, can simply contract out to civilian organizations. For example, in
February 1985, the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Research announced two,
of many, government-sponsored civilian research efforts:34
Undersea Acoustic Research-tomographysound speed field mapping, arctic data reduction, shallow water bottom acoustics: part
of a "continuing long-term program involving Woods Hole University and other university and contractor efforts."
Naval OceanographicResearch and Development Activity's AS W
Environment Acoustic Support (AEAS) Program-a U.S. Navy
advanced development project, the objective of which is to provide
ocean environmental acoustic support for the design, development, deployment and operational use of current and proposed
ASW [anti-submarine warfare] acoustic systems associated with
ships, submarines, aircraft, ordnance and surveillance: mine warfare, acoustic data processing and analysis, synthesis and evaluation of models and data bases, area/systems performance
assessments, and fleet support products. At most, the convention's
provisions on scientific research are likely to be no more than a
minor inconvenience.
The naval powers emerged from the UNCLOS III negotiations with their
national security interests, for the most part, ensured. Although the territorial sea limit has now been specifically addressed and expanded to twelve
nautical miles, and the concept of archipelagic waters has received recognition, navies will still be able to conduct activities in a regime that remains
largely permissive. However, because the principal naval and maritime states
have so far chosen to remain outside of the UNCLOS III framework established in the 1982 convention, many years of tension and discord are
likely, during which navies will be major components in states' initiatives
to safeguard their interests in ocean law and policy.
LOS and Sea Power: The Future
As of mid-March 1985, only fourteen states had ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea: Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Egypt, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Namibia, Philippines, Senegal,
and Zambia." Although several maritime states have signed the treaty, no
major naval power or maritime state has indicated that it is ready to ratify

34. Commerce Business Daily, 15 February 1985, p. 3; 16 February 1985, p. 5.
35. Information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal
Advisor, Treaty Affairs, March 1985.
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the document, which needs sixty ratifications to enter into force. Even
then, this number is a minimum requirement; far greater numbers and the
participation of powerful states will be necessary if the treaty is to have
the moral force that was the objective of those drafting its provisions. As
one observer has commented, "with due respect" to the states that have
already ratified the convention:
...they are rather a bunch of oddfellows. They include no western states, no Warsaw-pact ones, no Arab states except Egypt, no
Asian ones except the Philippines, no Latin Americans except Cuba
and Mexico, only six of the 51 African states. If the Convention
were to become law by being ratified by 60 states of no greater
weight than these ....

it could not have much real force. For one

thing, such a grouping could not afford to finance the elaborate
6
apparatus that is envisaged.1
There are three possible outcomes to the present situation. First, the
convention may never come into force. Second, it may "limp" into force,
with so few parties of any international consequence that global acceptance
of all provisions cannot, and should not be inferred. Finally, it is possible,
although highly unlikely at the juncture, that the 1982 treaty will enter into
force with a vast majority of states becoming parties, including some of
the powerful maritime states. However, an analysis of the contentious
seabed issues and a projection that perhaps as many as fifty new, developing "mini-states" may emerge by the first years of the next century
compelled John King Gamble to conclude that "at least two decades will
pass before harmony and 7consistency will be significant aspects of the
'3
emerging law of the sea."
It should be remembered, as well, in this regard, that an average of
six years was necessary for each of the 1958 Geneva conventions to come
into force. This was surprising given the fact that only four votes were cast
against approval of these instruments. Furthermore, in each instance, fewer
states signed the conventions than voted in favor of them, while nearly
fifty percent of all signatures were never ratified. The 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea is far more comprehensive, complex and ambitious
than the four 1958 Geneva conventions combined. Yet only fourteen states
have become parties to all four treaties, which in 1985 remain in force.
Only the most optimistic observer can foresee the 1982 convention ever
garnering global international acceptance and force.
If the treaty does eventually enter into force, although rejected by the
powerful states and without the participation of a majority of nations,
clearly its moral force would not be the same as the third possible outcome,
noted above (i.e., ratification by a majority of states including the great

36. The Economist, 22 December 1984, p. 30.
37. Gamble, Where Trends the Law of the Sea?, 10 Ocean Development & Int'l L.
62 (1982).
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powers) even if participation is not universal. In the latter case, even those
states not parties are affected, as Pollack remarked:
There is no doubt that, when all or most of the Great Powers have
deliberately agreed to certain rules of general application, the rules
approved by them have very great weight in practice even among
states which have never expressly consented to them. It is hardly
too much to say that declarations of this kind may be expected, in
the absence of prompt and effective dissent by some Power of the
first rank, to become part of the universally received law of na38
tions within a moderate time.
In the absence of dissent by the powerful states, whether the 1982
convention enters into force or not, certain provisions of the treaty may
continue to act as models for state behavior in the sense that they embody
customary law. Clearly, that is the position lately assumed by the United
States, as expressed by Ambassador Malone:
...there exists an international law of the sea totally independent
of the Law of the Sea Convention. And, indeed, the best evidence
for the existence of such a body of law lies in the fact that today
virtually all countries are applying rules of international law reflected in the treaty text even though that treaty is not in effect.
Of course, a treaty not in force cannot confer legal rights and
duties. Nevertheless, all coastal states now assert various jurisdictional rights, and all maritime states claim the rights of transit
reflected in the convention. This is not true with regard to the
seabed mining provisions.3 9
The U.S. position in essence is that the 1982 convention, first, codifies
customary law, second, reinforces provisions of the 1958 Geneva conventions that have not been affected by changes in state practices since the
late 1950s, and third, specifically with respect to the seabed articles, creates
new positive law. The navigation rights in the 1982 convention, inasmuch
as they are not "new or unique" but only "clarified and codified preexisting rights," can be "exercised by all states regardless of their status
as parties or nonparties to the Law of the Sea Treaty." 4 Even if the 1982
treaty enters into force, the United States maintains that customary international law confers rights and duties upon states that cannot be destroyed
if those states do not become parties to the new treaty. These rights and
duties will be altered only if it can be proven that the customary law itself
has changed. In a nutshell, the U.S. position is:
States certainly are free to continue to apply customary international law and to ignore de novo prescriptive provisions which
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have neither been tried nor admitted by wide practice to be source
of recognized international law. 4
This position is highly controversial as many supporters of the UNCLOS III-regime argue that the treaty creates new positive law in all areasnavigation as well as deep seabed exploitation-irrespective of what existed
before. If the treaty does enter into force, the intent of parties to the
convention to enforce the terms on non-parties will surely create the potential for conflict. Indeed, as John King Gamble has argued, looking
toward the year 2010:
For many countries of the world, claims to the oceans may be one
of the few political bargaining chips they have in a high stakes
game of international politics. During the next 20 years, the temptation to play these chips will be great. The likely results will be
increased tension, violence, and, maybe, regional wars. The combination of a volatile world situation, the desperate internal situation of many states, and the newness and uncertainty of managing
these zones, mean that the odds are the world will not get it right
42
the first time.
Sea power will figure prominently in the process by which the claims
and counter-claims are sorted out. In a sense, such short-term conflicts as
the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident over closing lines in the Mediterranean are
but a single aspect of the customary law-making process. And, given the
expectation that the 1982 treaty in its present form will never enter into
force, such positions and counter-positions are likely to multiply.
Perhaps by 2010, the controversy, tension, conflict, and violence of
the preceding twenty-five years will have contributed to a new consensus
on the law of the sea. In the interim, the navies of great powers and small
states alike will be relied upon to uphold national interests. So many variables will affect those interests that navies Will inevitably find themselves
deployed farther and farther from home ports to defend the policies of
their governments. These will be the occasions for disputes that are likely
to lead to conflict. Coastal or regional navies will be used to enforce local
claims, while "blue ocean," global navies like those of the United States
and the Soviet Union in 1985, and perhaps the Peoples Republic of China
in 2010, among others, may challenge them.
The intensifying instability of the international system will magnify
insecurities and make the industrialized states depend upon global sea power
as a necessary means of self-defense and, in Edward Heath's words, "the
only way of regaining dignity and authority in a hostile and confusing
world." New threats to national interests on land and in the seas in 2010
will give navies new responsibilities-countering terrorism, perhaps-and
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reaffirm old missions. Indeed, the future development of certain technologies will contribute to the continued suitability of sea power for undertaking peacetime and crisis political roles. Improved command, control,
and communications capabilities coupled with enhanced intelligence-gathering functions should reinforce national decision-makers' reliance on their
navies. Moreover, modern technologies and tactics for target location and
precise delivery of a wide variety of weapons are combining to produce a
future in which military forces will be unprecedentedly able to achieve the
effects their commanders require, should weapons' use be necessary. 41
In summary, the central role of navies as instruments of state policy
will be reinforced by the dynamics of the law of the sea over the next
quarter-century. The law in 2010 will be both a source of tension and a
foundation upon which the reliance on sea power will be based. Perhaps
D.P. O'Connell stated it in the most lucid manner when he forecast that:
... the occasion for navies to be employed to influence events will
be multiplied because the increasing complexities of the law of the
sea, with its proliferation of claims and texts and regimes covering
resources, pollution, security and navigation, are multiplying the
opportunities for disputes and the circumstances for the resolution
44
of disputes by the exertion of naval power.
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